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How to Make Scientists Agree








One of the basic problems in giving economic advice is to find sufficiently robust empirical
evidence for making policy recommendations. In many fields there exist conflicting theories and
empirical evidence is often mixed. For instance, theories on economic growth, innovation, and
technology or on the regulation of competition (anti trust laws) have devised results that are not
always robust, difficult to condense into simple recommendations, and sometimes contradictory.
The source of conflicting results in many areas are to be found in varying sets of assumptions in
theory and different standards and methods in empirics.
In order to base policies on “sound economic knowledge“ (or indeed sometimes only to
legitimize already taken decisions and to support existing preconceptions and beliefs) policy-
makers employ experts. The task for expert advisors or advisory boards is to base their
recommendations or proposals on some „general findings“ or „stylized view of the facts“
(KALDOR, 1968) in order to legitimize their advice. This task, however, often turns out to be
difficult due to the mentioned problem of conflicting theoretical and empirical results in many
(though not all) fields. 
Although there appears to exist some basic consensus with regard to some issues (see ALSTON
ET AL., 1992; FREY ET AL., 1984; KEARL ET AL., 1979), this consensus is not overwhelmingly
broad, is to be found only at a rather general level of abstraction, and tends to fall apart when it
comes to policy recommendations. Hence, the joke that by asking two economists for advice you
get (at least) three different answers. This situation leads to the more general question of how it
may be possible for (economic) scientists to agree on some scientific result.
Since there do not exist any “objective“ ways to decide on the “truth“ of scientific results,
social (and other) sciences have resorted to some method of “temporary consensus.“ This has
lead to various schools of thought involving scholars that agree upon certain views, assumptions
and methods. While there may be agreement within the school, there appears to be much– 2 –
disagreement between schools. Although the scientific competition between schools may have
produced “scientific progress“ in terms of the number of theories and sometimes in terms of
robustness and the range of applicability of results, there remain to exist substantial and basic
differences in focus, assumptions and methods – and hence in “results“.
In the following I will try to outline some basic mechanism that may help to bridge some of
the disagreement between schools, but especially within schools insofar as scholars are able to
agree on empirical methods to test conflicting theories or hypotheses. The aim is to enlarge the
area of consensus on „general findings“ or „stylized facts“ with regard to policy-making. The
prerequisite, however, is that scientists, possibly even from different schools, are willing to
engage in direct empirical competition, make available empirically testable theories or
hypotheses, and are able agree on empirical methods to test them. The incentives involved with
the mechanism once it is implemented, however, may encourage scientists to meet these
requirements.
2. Proposed Mechanism
The basic idea is to involve two scientists holding conflicting or opposing views, theories or
hypotheses on a given topic or research question in a scientific competition or “bet“. That is, two
scientists (say, theorists) bet on their prediction or hypothesis to hold or be supported by the data
with regard to a certain phenomenon or research question. A third (i.e. empirical) scientist is
employed to do the empirical work. The challenge for this third scientist is to propose a method
that allows to reject the hypotheses, and that both bidders can agree upon. After such agreement
is reached, the empirical part is executed by the third scientist alone without any interference of
the two competitors, and it is announced who won the bet. The entire procedure and results are
then published as a joint work of all three scientists involved.
The basic incentive for scientists to engage in such betting may be provided by a public
scoring or ranking of scientists. That is, the scientist winning a bet receives a certain number of
“points“ on the academic ranking list. Such a list would complement the existing methods of
ranking scientists (or academic departments) based on publications or citations. Hence, the
academic standing or reputation of a scholar would also be gauged by his or her ranking on that
list. Since the proposed mechanism submits scientists to rather strong conditions and procedures,
there may be a high reputation of such a list, and hence strong incentives for being on the list. It
also provides incentives for theorists and empiricists to work together.
In order to ensure the quality of the work publication is required for authors to receive any
“points“. The number of “points“ one receives for a won bet may also depend on the ranking of
journal where the paper is finally published so that the publication in a highly ranked journal
yields comparably more “points“. That is, some “basic points“ for winning are multiplied with
a factor associated with each academic journal.– 3 –
The design of the incentive scheme in terms of “points“ (P) may also involve appropriate
incentives for empiricists to “run the bet“ and for losers. For instance, winning a bet may give
2P and running it yields 1.5P, while losing it still would give 1P. Giving “points“ to losers is to
reward them for joining the bet, and to provide incentives for participation in such betting
(which, however, must be published to yield “points“). Also, winning a bet against a hypothesis
that has previously won other bets, or against opponents of high ranking may yield “extra points“
(similar to the ATP ranking in tennis).
In cases where both hypotheses under investigation are empirically rejected no one wins so
that both losers receive the same default number of “points“ for joining the bet, since the result
may still be of scientific value (to be judged by journal referees). In case that no hypothesis can
be rejected the empirical method is likely to be flawed so that no “points“ are awarded, and the
work is probably difficult to publish. This leads us to the case where one (or none) hypothesis
won the bet, but there are doubts about the empirical method. In this case a new bet among
empiricists may be run.
3. Discussion
The proposed mechanism is based on a betting-market with external incentives. These
incentives call on the scientists‘ strive for reputation, and the implied effects on academic status,
income, and access to research funds and facilities. It is a pairwise procedure, although it may
sometimes be possible to involve more than two scientists in betting. Ideally, winners are
challenged by new contestants who aim to increase their reputation. Such multi-stage betting is
evolutionary in nature in that it does not require some authority to guide or direct the process
(aside from the incentive scheme). The result of this process is open in the sense that the path that
consecutive betting takes is not predetermined. But the process is also to some extent path-
dependent in that later bets are based on the results of earlier bets the outcomes of which limits
the space of hypotheses available in a given research area. However, since new results often tend
to create new questions and puzzles, the process is unlikely to “converge“, but to produce new
results based on temporary agreement.
Agreement is important in several respects, because in order to run the bet the scientists must
agree upon several things up-front. First, they have to agree on the issue or research question that
has to be answered. The question has also to be defined sufficiently precise or specific in order
to be made operational for empirical testing. Second, the scientists must make available two (or
possibly more) empirically testable hypotheses that allow for sufficiently different predictions.
Obviously, they have to agree that each others‘ hypothesis is worth testing. Third, the scientists
have to agree upon the empirical method that will be employed to test both hypotheses
adequately. This may, for instance, involve agreement on what data set or what experimental
design to use. At this stage empiricists may help by proposing new and innovative methods.– 4 –
Fourth, scientists must agree on a third scientist who executes the empirical research (and he or
she must agree on doing so). – The incentives for reaching such agreements may be strong once
an accepted scoring list is in place. Given these ex ante agreements, it is difficult for scientists
to talk their way out of the evidence ex post when the results do not fit with their predictions or
hypotheses.
The method also opens new opportunities for specialization. In cases where scholars of
different schools “don‘t talk to each other“ other (young) scientists may specialize in confronting
theories in the way described. Similar arguments may hold when theories are too general or
abstract for empirical testing. Hence, there may be additional incentives to deduce testable
hypotheses from “pure“ or normative theories once the mechanism is in place. Empirical research
institutions may specialize in “running the bets“, and new journals (or sections of existing
journals) may specialize in publishing them.
The proposed mechanism appears to have straightforward desirable features in that it provides
incentives to use scarce research resources more efficiently with regard to an increase in number
(and possibly a reduction in variance) of empirically tested theories. Such redirection of research
resources toward the confrontation of conflicting theories and empirical testing may indeed be
desirable only if we understand economics as a theoretical and empirical discipline, and if we
believe in the value of empirical work as a basis for scientific progress and policy advice.
Although many economists may subscribe to this view (as I assume), the proposed
mechanism may still be difficult to implement. First, there do already exist established
mechanisms for reputation-building. The mechanism, however, is not supposed to replace them
but to complement them, and to add incentives in the direction just described. Second, scientists
may avoid being confronted with others directly (although conventional scientific moral seems
to suggest otherwise). The most promising way for implementation would probably be if the
mechanism was adopted by some major economic association (such as the AEA or EEA),
starting with a bet between two eminent scholars on an issue of basic importance and general
interest so that the procedure would be in the center of attention of the scientific community. The
association may then start to publish the personal rankings and routinely award prices (e.g., for
certain periods or for “life-time achievement“).
If the proposed mechanism (or variants to be discussed) cannot be implemented even though
its potential benefits once it is in place are generally acknowledged by the scientific community,
economists may still learn something about themselves and about economics. First,
implementation of “beneficial“ (say, efficiency-enhancing) mechanisms can be difficult or
impossible even if many agree on its benefits compared to the status quo. Hence, it is often not
enough to design optimal or efficient mechanisms and leave the problems of implementation to
others. Second, most people tend to avoid direct (or in fact any) competition if they can. Business– 5 –
leaders praise the benefits of free markets and competition in their public statements, but have
devised large arsenals of tools to reduce it in the markets they deliver. Economist have stressed
the positive welfare effects of competition in the economic realm, but may avoid direct
confrontation when it comes to their own business.
4. Conclusion
The aim of the proposed mechanism is at finding agreement on empirically robust results that
can be used for economic policy advice. The mechanism cannot dispense advisors from deducing
policy implications from the „general findings“ or „stylized facts“, but it may provide them with
a somewhat sounder basis for doing so. This is the only way to proceed if we believe in the value
of a combination of theory and empirical work as a basis of economic policy advice – as
compared to “pure“, or normative, or no theory.
The mechanism does by no means guarantee that policy-makers will adopt economists‘
proposals more thoroughly. Policy-makers are still likely to stick to their own views, beliefs and
preconceptions. They will still tend to use advisors to support their own interests, and to ignore
advice that runs counter to their normative and positive beliefs. However, economists may have
a somewhat stronger argument once such a mechanism is able to increase the degree of consensus
within the discipline on certain issues or fields of research.
In the light of the mentioned difficulties economists may even be tempted to refrain from
giving policy advice altogether. However, this would mean leaving policy-makers to their own,
which may not be a too attractive alternative. And, after all, there appears to be a demand for
policy advice that provides economists with many well-paid jobs.
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